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A THOUSAND SPLENDID GUNS
n Out of the Mountains, David Kilcullen provides a framework for his “theory 
of competitive control.” His work focuses on irregular warfare, and in general 
he addresses nonstate armed groups as one increment along a spectrum of ac-
tors competing to control a population. He theorizes that the competitor who 
can impose predictable norms through persuasive, administrative, and coercive 
means will succeed. The members of the target audience, for their part, need 
consistency, and will adhere to this normative system regardless of whether they 
inherently agree with it or with the competitor’s values.1 What do we learn when 
we apply Kilcullen’s core principles to China and its conduct in the wider western 
Pacific as a state-level competitor?
China’s overwhelming role in regional trade is certainly persuasive, often caus-
ing regional governments of their own volition to dilute their public response to 
Chinese actions rather than risk economic turmoil. Next, China’s island-building 
campaign coupled with China Coast Guard (CCG) support of aggressive com-
mercial activity demonstrates the regime’s intent to exert administrative control 
over disputed areas, even in the face of dissent from the United Nations and the 
international community in general. Finally, this article examines the presence 
and lethality that China’s surface navy provides as 
a key element of the country’s coercive capacity vis-
à-vis the United States and our regional partners.
WEIGHING THE COMPETITORS
Like infantry units ashore, surface combatants 
are the grunts of naval maneuver. The quickest 
method of comparing U.S. Navy combatants with 
those of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy 
I
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TABLE 1
ALPHABETICAL REFERENCE OF USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS 
WITH INVENTORY AND TONNAGE; SEE COMPANION FIGURE 1
Class Displacement (tons) Inventory Force Tonnage (tons)
Arleigh Burke Flt I DDG 8,950  21 187,950
Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG 8,946  7  62,622
Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG 9,155  34 311,270
Cyclone PC   354  13  4,602
Freedom LCS 3,089  2  6,178
Independence LCS 2,790  2  5,580
Ticonderoga CG 9,957  22 219,054
USN Total —  101 797,256
Houbei PTG  220  60  13,200
Houjian PGG  520  6  3,120
Houxin PGG  478  20  9,560
Jiangdao FFL 1,500  20  30,000
Jianghu I FF 1,702  9  15,318
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF 1,702  6  10,212
Jianghu III FF 1,924  1  1,924
Jiangkai I FF 3,900  2  7,800
Jiangkai II FFG 3,900  20  78,000
Jiangwei I FF 2,250  4  9,000
Jiangwei II FF 2,250  10  22,500
Luda I DD 3,670  2  7,340
Luda IV DD 3,730  4  14,920
Luhai DD 6,000  1  6,000
Luhu DD 4,600  2  9,200
Luyang I DDG 7,000  2  14,000
Luyang II DDG 7,000  6  42,000
Luyang III DDG 7,258  3  21,774
Luzhou DDG 7,000  2  14,000
Sovremenny I DDG 7,940  2  15,880
Sovremenny II DDG 7,940  2  15,880
PLAN Total — 184 361,628
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(PLAN) is a simple hull count: the United States has 101 in its inventory, while 
China comes to the table with 184. China’s numerical advantage gives it more 
flexibility in distributing its surface forces to contest or exercise sea control while 
maintaining an adequate coastal defense. Taking size (displacement measured by 
tonnage) into account yields a superficial advantage for the United States: nearly 
800,000 tons of warship compared with China’s 362,000 tons. Taken together, 
however, the distribution of greater U.S. tonnage into fewer hulls means a more 
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OUR KNIFE AT THEIR GUNFIGHT
The various vessels’ antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are the key differentiator 
when comparing their organic lethality. Only fifty of the U.S. Navy’s 101 surface 
combatants are equipped to carry a dedicated ASCM: the Flights I and II Arleigh 
Burke–class destroyers and the Ticonderoga-class cruisers. These ships each carry 
eight 1990s-era RGM-84 Harpoons capable of delivering a 488-pound warhead 
over sixty-seven nautical miles (nm). These ships plus an additional thirty-four 
Flight IIa destroyers also can fire the SM-2 in antisurface mode, but the SM-2 is a 
poor substitute because it was designed for air defense; for surface engagements 
it provides only a small warhead and a limited range. The SM-2 is counted here 
for fidelity purposes, with the assumption that each U.S. vessel would load forty 
of its vertical launch cells with SM-2s.
By comparison, all 184 ships listed for the PLAN have an ASCM capabil-
ity. Most carry the YJ-83, a domestic version of the C-802A that advertises a 
419-pound warhead and a 100 nm range. Some vessels have older missiles, but 
the Luyang II and Luyang III destroyers carry the modern YJ-62 (661-pound 
warhead, 150 nm range) and the YJ-18 (661-pound warhead, 290 nm range). 
These missile capabilities are based on available open-source data, frequently 
meaning the information describes the characteristics of export variants such as 
the C-802A. As the Office of Naval Intelligence states, “It is likely the domestic 
versions of these systems have much longer ranges.”2 Table 2 lists these vessels’ 
ASCM capabilities.
This is prima facie evidence that the U.S. Navy has been outmatched in the 
brute-force lethality of its surface combatants. Applying Commander Phillip 
Pournelle’s strike-mile metric quantifies that evidence.3 His metric (listed first) 
is based on delivery of a one-thousand-pound warhead across a given distance; 
subsequent measurements are derived below:
Strike-mile = warhead weight (pounds/1,000) × range (nm)
Individual vessel lethality = ASCM’s strike-mile × vessel’s ASCM load
Class lethality = vessel lethality × fleet inventory
Type lethality = sum of subordinate classes’ lethality
Applying these formulas leads to table 3 and figure 2.
PLAN surface combatants’ ability to deliver antisurface warfare (ASuW) ord-
nance exceeds the U.S. Navy’s by a factor of three. U.S. regional partners are im-
portant, but add little to our collective ASCM capability since they are equipped 
largely with Exocets, the same RGM-84s as the U.S. Navy’s (or older), and, ironi-
cally, China’s export C-802s—all of which can be generalized as being less capable 
than China’s domestic ASCMs.
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 * The SM-2 is an air-defense missile capable of being employed in a secondary ASuW mode.
Class ASCM Capacity Range (nm) Warhead (lbs)








Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG RGM-84 
SM-2*
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Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG SM-2*  40 (est.)  13 (est.)  254
Cyclone PC Griffin  8  5  13
Freedom LCS None — — —










Houbei PTG YJ-83  8 100  419
Houjian PGG YJ-83  6 100  419
Houxin PGG YJ-83  4 100  419
Jiangdao FFL YJ-83  4 100  419
Jianghu I FF HY-2  6  43.2 1,131
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jianghu III FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangkai I FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangkai II FFG YJ-83  8 100  419
Jiangwei I FF YJ-83  6 100  419
Jiangwei II FF YJ-83  8 100  419
Luda I DD CSS-N-2  6  22 1,000
Luda IV DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luhai DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luhu DD YJ-83 16 100  419
Luyang I DDG YJ-83 16 100  419
Luyang II DDG YJ-62  8 150  661
Luyang III DDG YJ-18  32 (est.) 290  661
Luzhou DDG YJ-83  8 100  419
Sovremenny I DDG SS-N-22a  8  87  661
Sovremenny II DDG SS-N-22b  8 130  661
TABLE 2
USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS’ ASCM CAPABILITIES
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Class Inventory Single Vessel Lethality (strike-miles)
Class Lethality 
(strike-miles)
Arleigh Burke Flt I DDG  21  261.57  5,492.93
Arleigh Burke Flt II DDG  7  261.57  1,830.98
Arleigh Burke Flt IIa DDG  34  132.08  4,490.72
Cyclone PC  13  .52  6.76
Freedom LCS  2  0  0
Independence LCS  2  0  0
Ticonderoga CG  22  261.57  5,754.50
USN Total 101  — 17,575.89
Houbei PTG  60  335.20  20,112.00
Houjian PGG  6  251.40  1,508.40
Houxin PGG  20  167.60  3,352.00
Jiangdao FFL  20  167.60  3,352.00
Jianghu I FF  9  293.16  2,638.40
Jianghu I (upgrade) FF  6  335.20  2,011.20
Jianghu III FF  1  335.20  335.20
Jiangkai I FF  2  335.20  670.40
Jiangkai II FFG  20  335.20  6,704.00
Jiangwei I FF  4  251.40  1,005.60
Jiangwei II FF  10  335.20  3,352.00
Luda I DD  2  132.00  264.00
Luda IV DD  4  670.40  2,681.60
Luhai DD  1  670.40  670.40
Luhu DD  2  670.40  1,340.80
Luyang I DDG  2  670.40  1,340.80
Luyang II DDG  6  793.20  4,759.20
Luyang III DDG  3 6,134.08  18,402.24
Luzhou DDG  2  335.20  670.40
Sovremenny I DDG  2  460.06  920.11
Sovremenny II DDG  2  687.44  1,374.88
PLAN Total  184  —  77,465.63
TABLE 3
ALPHABETICAL REFERENCE OF USN AND PLAN SURFACE COMBATANTS  
WITH VESSEL AND CLASS LETHALITY; SEE COMPANION FIGURE 2
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This is not surprising, given the U.S. Navy’s neglect of the ASuW mission fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War. The price we pay for this neglect is a surface fleet 
doctrinally focused on air defense but relatively incapable of delivering an offen-
sive punch at sea. China, by contrast, has engineered a credible threat that con-
stitutes the maritime cornerstone of its coercive capability in the western Pacific.
DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY IN ACTION
The magnitude of the ASuW mismatch contributed to the U.S. surface navy’s 
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of old ways, returning the fleet to the premise that every ship should be able to 
contribute to the ASuW fight. While the United States arguably remains ahead 
of China in command and control at sea (a gap that China doubtless is closing), 
the PLAN has been implementing distributed lethality’s underlying weapons 
capability since day one of its modern shipbuilding program. This allows China 
to contest and exercise tactical sea control by using distributed lethality exactly 
as the U.S. Navy envisions it: by operating deadly warships independently and in 
small groups.
An individual warship’s immediate combat influence rests on its ability to de-
liver ordnance (its strike-mile metric). Translating that to control of “real estate” 
at sea depends on the range of the warship’s ASCMs. A single PLAN combatant 
carrying the YJ-83 can influence a 200 nm–wide circle that covers 31,400 nm2 of 
sea space. Any vessel in that circle, warship or otherwise, is subject to engagement 
by the PLAN combatant. This certainly represents a, if not the, coercive force 
acting on any ship captain, commercial company, or fleet commander who is 
considering whether to hazard vessels through an opposed environment picketed 
by PLAN combatants.
Consider a linear one-against-one engagement between the most numerous 
blue-water ships of the U.S. Navy and the PLAN: an Arleigh Burke–class Flight 
IIa destroyer (DDG) and a Jiangkai II–class frigate. At problem start, the two 
vessels are 100 nm apart. The Burke is making thirty knots toward the Jiangkai, 
but the Jiangkai’s simplest option is to exhaust the Burke by making a tactical 
withdrawal at, say, twenty-five knots, yielding a five-knot closure rate. This puts 
the U.S. DDG within enemy weapons range for more than seventeen hours before 
it is able to return fire. The most dangerous time comes around hour 16 when 
air-defense watchstanders are fatigued, the Burke is just outside the SM-2’s ASuW 
range, and the Jiangkai can launch a rapid saturation attack with some or all of its 
YJ-83s. Even when the Burke gets within range, it can engage only by using SM-2s 
that (1) have not been used already in self-defense against the YJ-83s, and (2) are 
fired in a secondary ASuW mode.
Unfortunately, the underlying premise of this theoretical engagement is itself 
a tactical error: sending an air-defense destroyer to run down a surface-warfare 
frigate. That error precisely illustrates the limitations we have imposed on our 
fleet commanders and ourselves. The PLAN has gained the initiative by being 
able to outgun our surface combatants in a kinetic engagement.
Combining three or four PLAN combatants into a surface action group (SAG) 
magnifies their lethality. The SAG gains maneuver and attack-vector options, 
complicates its adversary’s targeting requirements, and increases the combat en-
vironment’s ASCM density—the tenets of Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, Rear 
Admiral Peter Gumataotao, and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta’s distributed lethality.5 
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The SAG also gains redundancy and the ability to share tasks—for example, by 
sectoring engagement responsibilities or delegating air-defense and antisubma-
rine warfare duties. When it comes to sea control, the commander of a four-ship 
PLAN SAG can turn the coercive influence of a single vessel into a formation 
that provides ASCM coverage over the majority of a 400 × 400 nm box while 
keeping every component vessel within mutual-support range. Today that means 
one SAG can distribute enough firepower to cover the Spratly Islands’ 120,000 
nm2.6 This indeed represents the sharp edge of China’s coercive capability at the 
tactical level.
ON STRATEGY
The specter of a maritime war, more than any other military threat, is the iron 
fist beneath the not-so-velvet glove of Chinese policy assertions in the East and 
South China Seas (the ECS and SCS). China’s current military strategy document 
espouses a policy of “active defense in the new situation,” explained as “adherence 
to the unity [among] strategic defense and operational and tactical offense.” The 
document states more specifically regarding the maritime domain, “The tradi-
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covers trade and diplomacy, China’s military policy appears to advance a limited-
war doctrine focused on the sea. At present, China relies on challengers vividly 
perceiving the tactical implications of its naval presence to provide Kilcullen’s 
coercive component at the national level.
The strategic cohesion of China’s persuasive trade, administrative presence, 
and coercive capability is particularly visible for policy makers in China’s near 
abroad. For instance, trade with China constituted 14.5 percent (U.S.$366.5 
billion) of total trade for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in 2014—ASEAN’s largest single-country trading partner. The United States 
provided more than one-third less, at 8.4 percent, or U.S.$212.4 billion.8 Even 
Vietnam and the Philippines, which have significant disagreements with China in 
the SCS, list China as their first- and second-largest partner, respectively, in terms 
of total trade.9 Japan, one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Pacific, lists China as 
its largest overall trading partner as well, and has done so since 2008.10 Yet also in 
2014, China “reclaimed” and militarized thousands of acres in the Spratly Islands 
disputed with the Philippines, used dozens of vessels to escort an oil-prospecting 
platform through Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and enforced a con-
troversial air-defense identification zone above the ECS west of Japan.
Beyond such gross trade metrics, economic analysis in the Asia-Pacific is in-
tensely complicated, with additional factors to be considered that include foreign 
direct investment, labor costs, and capital flows. An aggressive policy by Beijing 
could move China’s economic influence from persuasive to coercive, but this 
likely would result in only a Pyrrhic victory, by smothering regional economies 
under a mercantilist blanket. However, as China’s actions indicate, the country’s 
naval power, especially the lethality of its warships, makes this escalation unnec-
essary. The fact that PLAN combatants fulfill the military (i.e., coercive) element 
of Chinese national power means Beijing can keep the setting of its economic 
throttles squarely on “persuasive.”
It is worth noting that although CCG vessels conducted many of China’s 
more questionable presence activities, PLAN surface combatants were often just 
around the corner. It is reasonable to conclude that these warships take note of 
CCG practices in relation to their own future operations. Herein lies one subtlety 
of the PLAN’s coercive force at the strategic level: it would be equally reasonable 
for a government in the region to infer that China one day could replace the front 
line of CCG vessels with ASCM-armed PLAN ships. That change in presence 
would increase China’s sea control exponentially by allowing it to hold an entire 
region at risk physically and economically—strong incentives to dissuade any 
leader from responding strongly.
Nations with deep economic interests at stake but insufficient military force 
to defend them often feel compelled (1) to seek powerful allies and (2) to make 
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deeper concessions to avoid conflict. This is especially so in the present situa-
tion, in which overwhelming military advantage undergirds China’s position. 
The Philippine government provides one example: it has experienced failure in 
attempts to enforce the sovereignty of the country’s territory (such as the oft-
thwarted efforts to resupply RPS Sierra Madre) and to use its EEZ (its fishing 
vessels frequently are bullied out of the area). This is precisely because the Philip-
pine navy cannot compete against the CCG, let alone the PLAN.11 The Philippine 
government is limited to diplomatic appeals because, in the absence of allies, the 
PLAN easily could defeat the Philippine navy at sea.
Enter the United States. One anonymous senior official from an SCS state told 
Robert Kaplan in 2011, “Plan B is the U.S. Navy. . . . An American military pres-
ence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.”12 The weight of 
U.S. economic diplomacy and the prestige of our military bring balance to the 
western Pacific. For now, we are the partner of choice.
The PLAN’s ASCMs have narrowed that choice, though, and have gained 
strategic influence for China by developing a capability precisely where the U.S. 
Navy is weak. Sea control is vital to the Pacific economy, so when considering 
who is best able to provide a predictable order in peace or war, “a more capable 
PLAN” should be read as “a PLAN more capable of defeating the U.S. Navy.” This 
matters immensely to our regional partners as they weigh U.S. commitment and 
capability against the same traits of the Chinese government, with the added 
consideration of China’s superiority in trade, presence, and proximity.
USING THE RIGHT TOOL
When it comes to sea control, the U.S. Navy by doctrine is centered on aviation 
and the carrier strike group (CSG). Even the authors of distributed lethality refer 
to the U.S. surface navy’s high-value-asset defense as “our core doctrine.”13 First 
and foremost, this doctrine relies on a no-fail premise of carrier survival in com-
bat; the CSG’s lethality is contingent on having a platform from which to launch 
and recover aircraft. Second, a U.S. carrier is an impressive sight, but arguably it 
is an inefficient and expensive way to provide presence at sea anytime there is 
no additional concurrent mission, such as combat, strike, or humanitarian assis-
tance. Third, China’s Dragon Eye shipborne phased-array radar, HHQ-9 surface-
to-air missile, DF-21 antiship ballistic missile, and carrier aviation (the latter un-
der development, with Liaoning) all are eroding the U.S. asymmetric advantage 
of effectively delivering carrier-based ordnance outside enemy weapons range.
The U.S. Navy’s submarine force frequently is cited as a powerful, lethal com-
ponent, and rightly so. But the strength of the silent service lies in its stealth. In 
what China calls the “informationized environment” of the western Pacific, a 
stealthy threat contributes little to public narratives, with the phrase “out of sight, 
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out of mind” applying. Even the current advantages that submarines provide to 
the United States in surveillance and wartime lethality are shrinking as more-
expensive platforms lead to fewer hulls. Our adversaries may take into account 
the superb lethality of a U.S. submarine, but that vessel is not the right tool for re-
assuring our partners when it comes to countering the PLAN’s coercive presence.
{LINE SPACE}
Whether U.S. or Chinese, a fleet of well-armed surface combatants provides the 
most economical, resilient, and visible force in the western Pacific. Such vessels 
are indispensable to sea control—the classic enablers of other activities. The hu-
man security of maritime cultures, their use of natural economic resources, and 
the flow of licit trade require a predictable peacetime environment to thrive. If 
conflict comes, the mobility, defense, and resupply of ground troops, land-based 
aviation assets, and ballistic missile defenses need enduring sea control to be 
effective.
The U.S. Navy cannot let “better” be the enemy of “good” in reinvigorating 
ASuW capabilities. Implementing distributed lethality, developing ASCM pro-
grams, and acquiring affordable small- to medium-sized surface combatants 
must be a priority for the U.S. Navy (especially in the Pacific) because they do 
not constitute mere upgrades to an existing ASuW capability—they are a revival 
from near zero.
Beyond our own, the maritime forces of our Pacific allies are crucial, regard-
less of our collective ASCM shortfalls. The western Pacific is as familiar to Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy vessels as the Virginia 
Capes and Southern California operation areas are to the U.S. Navy. There is no 
reason the United States and these strategic partners should not collaborate to 
close the ASCM gap by sharing technology, employing our platforms together, 
and sharing the burden of development and production costs. After all, history 
has shown that committed allies are greater than the sum of their parts.
However, our collective ASuW gap is symptomatic of a larger strategic issue: 
China’s coercive naval force is already a compelling feature of the western Pacific. 
Our National Security Strategy recognizes China’s “new situation” (its desired 
normative order) in the SCS, stating, “On territorial disputes, particularly in 
Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation.”14 
The National Military Strategy cites China more explicitly as “adding tension 
to the Asia-Pacific region,” making claims “inconsistent with international law” 
and undertaking “aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to posi-
tion military forces astride vital international sea lanes.”15 China is succeeding 
in these contentious actions because it has laid the foundations of competitive 
control. It has made its trade persuasive, if not vital, to regional economies; has 
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built a capability to assert administrative control; and, most importantly, has 
underwritten all of this with a coercive force. Finally, China uses these levers in 
the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic ecosystem to spin the situ-
ation for external consumption.
Fortunately, the United States does not need its own coercive force per se; 
many nations in the region want to partner with us, and our diplomatic positions 
comport with the norms of international law. What is needed is the presence of 
a balanced fleet to support the policies laid out in our strategy documents and to 
reassure partner nations of our readiness to oppose coercion while they develop 
their own capabilities. Rebalancing our fleet is not a threat to the sovereignty 
of any country that conducts itself by the rule of law. It most certainly should 
be viewed, though, as a potent counter to every country that makes illegitimate 
claims against our allies and partners.
China and the United States are not yet adversaries—but we are competitors. 
China’s recent devaluation of the yuan is indicative of long-discussed economic 
vulnerabilities that may herald a decline in the country’s persuasive trade influ-
ence. Exploiting that decline with a strategy that unites U.S. economic diplomacy 
and a rule-of-law narrative with a balanced maritime force can counter the com-
ponents of China’s competitive control in the western Pacific. Successful imple-
mentation will incline all parties toward a diplomatic solution that averts armed 
conflict. However, the mismatch between China’s rhetoric and its disregard for 
international standards does not bode well. And intentions change faster than 
capabilities.
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